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Abstract. In this paper, we use genus theory to analyze the hardness
of the decisional Diffie–Hellman problem (DDH) for ideal class groups
of imaginary quadratic orders, acting on sets of elliptic curves through
isogenies; such actions are used in the Couveignes–Rostovtsev–Stolbunov
protocol and in CSIDH. Concretely, genus theory equips every imaginary
quadratic order O with a set of assigned characters χ : cl(O) → {±1},
and for each such character and every secret ideal class [a] connecting
two public elliptic curves E and E′ = [a] ? E, we show how to compute
χ([a]) given only E and E′, i.e. without knowledge of [a]. In practice,
this breaks DDH as soon as the class number is even, which is true for
a density 1 subset of all imaginary quadratic orders. For instance, our
attack works very efficiently for all supersingular elliptic curves over Fp
with p ≡ 1 mod 4. Our method relies on computing Tate pairings and
walking down isogeny volcanoes.
Keywords: Decisional Diffie-Hellman, isogeny-based cryptography, class group
action, CSIDH.
1 Introduction
“The Decision Diffie–Hellman assumption (DDH) is a gold mine”, Dan Boneh
wrote in his 1998 overview paper [3]. This statement still holds true (maybe even
more so), since DDH is fundamental to prove security of many widely used pro-
tocols such as Diffie–Hellman key agreement [17], El Gamal encryption [19], but
can also be used to construct pseudo-random functions [25], and more advanced
functionalities such as circular-secure encryption [4] and UC-secure oblivious
transfer [26].
Let (G, ·) be a finite cyclic group with generator g, then the DDH problem
states that it is hard to distinguish the distributions (ga, gb, gab) and (ga, gb, gr)
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where a, b, r are chosen randomly in [1,#G]. Due to its very definition as a
distinguishing problem, DDH can be used quite naturally as a building block
for provably secure constructions, i.e. IND-CPA or IND-CCA encryption [12].
In practice, the group G is typically chosen as a cyclic prime order subgroup
of a finite field F∗p or of an elliptic curve group E(Fq). Although Diffie and
Hellman [17] originally worked in the full multiplicative group F∗p, it is easy to see
that DDH is not secure in this case since the Legendre symbol easily distinguishes
both distributions. An equivalent interpretation is that the Legendre symbol
provides an efficiently computable character, mapping F∗p onto the group {±1},
which acts as a distinguisher.
The classical hardness of DDH is well understood and clear recommenda-
tions [13] to attain certain security levels have been agreed upon by the cryp-
tographic community. In the quantum setting however, DDH is easy as shown
by Shor [29], who devised an algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem
(DLP) in any group in polynomial time and space. The DLP asks, given a tuple
(g, ga), to recover the exponent a. Solving DLP efficiently implies solving DDH
efficiently.
Class group actions Shor’s algorithm relies on the fact that the group oper-
ation in G can be efficiently computed, and thus a priori, that it is computable.
To devise a post-quantum secure alternative for group-based DDH one could try
to represent the group G by an object with much less inherent structure, e.g.
a set X. Such a representation can be obtained from a group action, which is
a map ? : G × X → X : (g,E) 7→ g ? E compatible with the group operation,
i.e. (g · h) ? E = g ? (h ? E). If the group action is free and transitive, i.e. for
every E,E′ ∈ X there exists exactly one g ∈ G such that E′ = g ? E, then X is
called a principal homogeneous space for G. Note that for every fixed base point
E ∈ X we thus obtain a representation of the group G by mapping g to g ? E.
As first observed by Couveignes [10] and later independently by Rostovtsev
and Stolbunov [27], generalizing the Diffie–Hellman key agreement to group ac-
tions is immediate: Alice and Bob agree on a base point E ∈ X, each choose a
secret element a and b in G, and exchange a ? E and b ? E. Since G is commut-
ative and ? a group action, both can compute the common element (a · b) ? E.
Recovering a ∈ G from a ? E is called the vectorization problem (generalizing
DLP), and recovering (a · b) ? E from a ? E and b ? E is called parallelization
(generalizing CDH). When both problems are hard, Couveignes called X a hard
homogeneous space for G. Couveignes, Rostovtsev and Stolbunov (CRS) and
more recently CSIDH [8] by Castryck, Lange, Martindale, Panny and Renes in-
stantiated this framework as follows: G is the class group cl(O) of an order O
in an imaginary quadratic field, and X = E` `p(O, t) is the set of elliptic curves
over a finite prime field Fp with Fp-rational endomorphism ring O and trace
of Frobenius t. Whereas CRS restricted to ordinary elliptic curves, CSIDH uses
supersingular elliptic curves and is several orders of magnitude faster than CRS.
Using the above group action can be seen as a trade-off: the lack of a natural
operation on the set X itself makes the construction possibly post-quantum
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secure, but also limits its flexibility, i.e. it is not possible to simply translate any
DLP-based protocol into an equivalent one using group actions. Furthermore,
since X is supposed to “hide” G, it is generally assumed that the group structure
of G itself has little influence on the hardness of the underlying group action
problems. In this paper, we disprove this assumption.
Contributions The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem (sometimes called de-
cisional parallelization) for class group actions asks to distinguish between the
distributions ([a]?E, [b]?E, ([a]·[b])?E) and ([a]?E, [b]?E, [r]?E) with [a], [b], [r]
random elements in cl(O). A natural attack strategy would be to try to exploit
the group structure of cl(O), as was done for DDH in F∗p using the Legendre
symbol. We immediately run into two problems:
1. In general, very little is known about the concrete structure of cl(O) as
an abelian group. For instance, computing the order of cl(O) is already
a highly non-trivial task [20, 1]. A notable exception is the structure of
the 2-torsion subgroup of cl(O): genus theory [11, I.§3 & II.§7] provides a
very explicit description of cl(O)[2] ' cl(O)/ cl(O)2 by defining a set of
characters χi : cl(O) → {±1} and recovering cl(O)2 as the intersection of
the kernels of the χi. The characters χi correspond to the prime factors mi
of the discriminant ∆O (with the prime 2 requiring special treatment) and
can be computed in time polynomial in the size of mi. Note that each of
these characters χi (if non-trivial) can be used to break DDH in cl(O) itself;
however we are not trying to solve DDH in cl(O), but DDH for class group
actions.
2. Given the structure of cl(O)[2] through genus theory, it is unclear how the
characters χi can be computed directly on elements in X, i.e. given an ele-
ment [a] ? E for some unknown [a] ∈ cl(O), we need to compute χi([a])
(without computing [a] first, since vectorization is assumed hard).
The main contribution of this paper is an algorithm to compute the characters
χi directly on the set X = E` `p(O, t) in time exponential in the size of mi. Since
we only need to compute one such χi efficiently to break DDH, we conclude
that DDH for class group actions is insecure when cl(O)[2] is non-trivial and the
discriminant ∆O is divisible by a small enough prime factor. Since cl(O)[2] is
only trivial when ∆O = −q or ∆O = −4q with q ≡ 3 mod 4 prime, and since
almost all integers contain polynomially small prime factors (this follows, at
least heuristically, from Mertens’ third theorem; see [33, III.§6] for more precise
statements), we expect that our attack works in polynomial time (in log p) for a
subset of density 1 of all imaginary quadratic orders.
In the special case of supersingular elliptic curves over Fp, our attack does
not apply for primes p ≡ 3 (mod 4). However, for p ≡ 1 (mod 4), we have
O = Z[√−p] and ∆O = −4p. Genus theory defines a non-trivial character δ
associated with the prime divisor 2 of ∆O. We derive a very simple formula to
compute δ([a]) that uses only the Weierstrass equations of E and E′ = [a] ? E.
In this case, our attack is particularly efficient and we can break DDH using a
few exponentiations in Fp.
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High level overview of the attack To explain the main underlying ideas,
we detail the thought process we followed to derive the attack in a simple (yet
very general) setting. Fixing a base curve E, the class group action ? gives us
a representation of cl(O) on the set X = E` `p(O, t) by mapping a class [a] to
E′ = [a]?E. For every odd prime divisor m of the discriminant ∆O, genus theory
provides a character
χ : cl(O)→ {±1} : [a] 7→
(
N(a)
m
)
,
where
( ·
·
)
denotes the Legendre symbol and the representative a of the class [a]
is chosen such that its norm N(a) is coprime to m. The goal is to compute χ([a])
given only the pair (E,E′).
Let ϕ : E → E′ denote the isogeny corresponding to a, then N(a) = deg(ϕ),
so to compute χ, it suffices to determine deg(ϕ) mod m, up to non-zero squares
in Z/(m). The starting idea is the following: assume we know a tuple (P,Q) ∈ E2
and the corresponding tuple (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) ∈ E′2, computing deg(ϕ) mod m is
easy thanks to the compatibility of the reduced m-Tate pairing Tm
Tm(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = Tm(P,Q)
deg(ϕ) .
If the pairing is non-trivial, both sides will be primitive m-th roots of unity, so
computing discrete logs gives deg(ϕ) mod m.
The difficulty is of course, that in practice we are not given such corres-
ponding tuples (P,Q) and (ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)), so we need to find a workaround. The
only information we really have about ϕ is that it is an Fp-rational isogeny of
degree coprime to m. Under the assumption that E(Fp) has a unique subgroup
of order m, this implies that E′(Fp) similarly has such a unique subgroup, and
furthermore, ϕ(E(Fp)[m]) = E′(Fp)[m]. If we let P be a generator of E(Fp)[m]
and P ′ a generator of E′(Fp)[m], then we know there exists some k ∈ [1,m− 1]
such that ϕ(P ) = kP ′. Note however, that if we assume we know a point Q
and its image ϕ(Q) (but not the image of P under ϕ), we do not learn anything
since the values Tm(kP
′, ϕ(Q)) = Tm(P ′, ϕ(Q))k run through the whole of µm
for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and we do not know k.
The main insight now is that we do not need to recover deg(ϕ) exactly but
only up to squares, so if we could recover k2 deg(ϕ) then it is clear we can still
compute χ([a]). This hints at a possible solution as long as Q is somehow derived
from P and that the same unknown scalar k can be used to compensate for the
difference not only between ϕ(P ) and P ′, but also between ϕ(Q) and Q′. Indeed,
computing Tm(P
′, Q′) would then recover the correct value up to a square in the
exponent, namely Tm(P,Q)
deg(ϕ)k2 . The simplest choice clearly is to take Q = P
and Q′ = P ′, and if there is no Fp-rational m2-torsion, we can show that the self-
pairings Tm(P, P ) and Tm(P
′, P ′) are non-trivial. This feature is specific to the
Tate pairing, and resorting to the Weil pairing would fail. Denote with valm(N)
the m-adic valuation of N , i.e. the maximum power v such that mv | N , then
valm(#E(Fp)) = 1 is equivalent to the existence of a unique rational subgroup
of order m and the non-existence of rational m2-torsion.
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In the more general case of v = valm(#E(Fp)) > 1, we first walk down to the
floor of the m-isogeny volcano reaching a curve E0 with E0(Fq)[m∞] = Z/(mv),
and then choose points P and P ′ of order m and corresponding points Q and
Q′ of order mv satisfying mv−1Q = P and mv−1Q′ = P ′. Note that also in this
case, the same unknown scalar k will compensate for both differences.
To sum up, we use the Tate pairing of certain points to obtain information
on degϕ (up to squares modm). By genus theory, we see that we are actually
computing the assigned characters of cl(O) directly from curves in E` `p(O, t).
Whenever the characters are non-trivial, their multiplicative property allows us
to break DDH in E` `p(O, t).
Paper organization In Section 2 we recall the necessary background on iso-
genies and isogeny volcanoes, class group actions, genus theory and the Tate
pairing. In Section 3 we derive an algorithm to compute the assigned charac-
ters in the case of ordinary elliptic curves, whereas in Section 4 we deal with
supersingular curves. In Section 5 we analyze the impact on the DDH problem
for class group actions, report on our implementation of the attack, and propose
countermeasures. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and provides avenues
for further research.
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2 Background
2.1 Isogenies
Let E,E′/Fq be elliptic curves. An isogeny ϕ : E → E′ is a non-constant morph-
ism such that ϕ(0E) = 0E′ , where 0 denotes the point at infinity. Equivalently,
an isogeny is a surjective group homomorphism of elliptic curves, which is also
an algebraic morphism. An endomorphism of E is either the zero map or an iso-
geny from E to itself, and the set of endomorphisms forms a ring End(E) under
addition and composition. We write EndFq (E) to denote the subring of endo-
morphisms defined over Fq. Two important examples of endomorphisms are: the
multiplication-by-n map [n] : E → E,P 7→ [n]P (often simply denoted by n)
and the q-power Frobenius endomorphism piq : E → E : (x, y) 7→ (xq, yq). If q is
clear from the context, we will simply write pi. In End(E), the Frobenius endo-
morphism satisfies pi2− tpi+ q = 0 where t = trpi is called the trace of Frobenius
and satisfies |t| ≤ 2√q. Alternatively, the trace of Frobenius is characterized by
#E(Fq) = q + 1− t. If gcd(t, q) = 1, the curve is called ordinary, otherwise it is
called supersingular. Unless |t| = 2√q, which can only happen for supersingular
elliptic curves over even degree extension fields, we have thatO = EndFq (E) is an
order in the imaginary quadratic field K = Q(pi) = Q(
√
t2 − 4q). Since O always
contains Z[pi] as a suborder, its discriminant ∆O satisfies ∆Z[pi] = t2−4q = c2∆O
for some non-zero c ∈ Z.
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The degree of an isogeny ϕ is just its degree as a morphism, which equals the
size of the kernel ker(ϕ) (we say ϕ is a separable isogeny) unless char(Fq)|deg(ϕ)
(we say ϕ is an inseparable isogeny). Separable isogenies can always be recon-
structed from their kernel. When the kernel ker(ϕ) is invariant under Frobenius
(as a set), the corresponding isogeny ϕ is Fq-rational. Note that we do not ne-
cessarily have ker(ϕ) ⊂ E(Fq), but only that ϕ can be given by Fq-rational
maps. The kernel of the multiplication by n map is denoted as E[n], and we set
E[n∞] = ∪k∈N>0E[nk].
For a prime m - charFq, isogenies of degree m are called m-isogenies and
their kernel kerϕ ⊂ E[m] is always a cyclic subgroup of E[m]. It is therefore
natural that the m-isogenies of an elliptic curve E depend on the structure of
E(Fq)[m∞]. Moreover, for any isogeny ϕ : E → E′, there is a dual isogeny
ϕˆ : E′ → E satisfying ϕ ◦ ϕˆ = [degϕ] and ϕˆ ◦ ϕ = [degϕ]. Since deg[n] = n2 for
any n ∈ Z>0, the dual isogeny ϕˆ has the same degree as ϕ.
2.2 Volcanoes
By Tate’s theorem [32], two elliptic curves over Fq are isogenous (over Fq) if and
only if they have the same number of Fq-rational points, which is equivalent to
having the same trace of Frobenius. Let E` `q(t) be the set of Fq-isomorphism
classes of elliptic curves over Fq with trace of Frobenius t, and assume that
E` `q(t) is non-empty.
For a prime number m - q, we define the m-isogeny graph Gq,m(t) as follows:
the set of vertices is E` `q(t) and the edges are m-isogenies. Away from elliptic
curves with extra automorphisms (i.e., away from the curves with j-invariant 0
or 1728), this graph can be made undirected by identifying dual isogenies.
An m-volcano is a connected undirected graph with vertices partitioned into
levels V0, . . . , Vh such that
– the subgraph Vh (the crater) is a regular connected graph of degree ≤ 2,
– for all 0 ≤ i < h, every vertex in level Vi is connected to exactly one vertex
in Vi+1,
– for all i > 0, every vertex in Vi has degree m+ 1.
Note that this implies that all the vertices on level V0 (the floor) have degree
1. We call h the height of the volcano (some authors swap Vh and V0 and call
h the depth). The crater Vh is also sometimes called the surface of the volcano.
An example of a volcano can be seen in Figure 1.
Theorem 1. Let Gq,m(t) be as above, and assume that gcd(t, q) = 1, so that
we are in the ordinary case. Take any connected component V of Gq,m(t) that
does not contain curves with j-invariant 0 or 1728. Then V is a volcano, say of
height h, and
1. the elliptic curves on level i all have the same endomorphism ring Oi, with
discriminant ∆Oi = m
2i∆Oh ,
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2. the endomorphism ring Oh of the elliptic curves on the surface Vh is locally
maximal at m; equivalently, if m is odd then m2 - ∆Oh , while if m = 2 and
4 | ∆Oh then ∆Oh/4 ≡ 2, 3 mod 4,
3. the endomorphism ring O0 of the elliptic curves on the floor V0 satisfies
valm(∆O0) = valm(t
2 − 4q).
In particular, if m is odd then h = bvalm(t2−4q)/2c, while if m = 2 then h may
be 1 less than this value.
Proof. This follows from Proposition 23 in [22] (note that the name volcano was
introduced only later by [18]).
An analogous volcano structure for supersingular curves over Fp was given in [16],
but will not be needed in our discussion of supersingular curves in Section 4.
V2
V1
V0
Figure 1. A 3-volcano of height h = 2, together with its levels. This corresponds to the
case where the prime 3 splits in Oh, into two degree 3 prime ideals whose ideal-classes
(which are each other’s inverses) have order 5.
Suppose E ∈ Vi and E′ ∈ Vj . We say that an m-isogeny ϕ : E → E′ is
ascending (descending, horizontal) if j = i+1 (j = i−1, i = j). On the volcano,
this corresponds to the crater being on top, the floor on the bottom, while the
only horizontal steps are permitted along the crater.
Remark 2. If j = 0 or j = 1728 do appear in V , then the theorem remains “suf-
ficiently valid” for our purposes; the only difference is that Gq,m(t) may become
undirected: there may exist descending isogenies from the crater Vh to level Vh−1
which need to be considered with multiplicity, while the dual ascending isogeny
still accounts for multiplicity 1. We will ignore this issue in what follows. Note
that the endomorphism rings of the curves with j-invariant 0 or 1728 have trivial
class groups, so this remark only affects suborders of (certain) numbers fields
having class number 1. Such suborders are usually not considered in isogeny-
based cryptography, although they make an appearance in the recent OSIDH
protocol due to Colo` and Kohel [9].
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2.3 Diffie–Hellman for class group actions
Let O be an order in an imaginary quadratic number field and let t ∈ Z. To each
prime power q = pn we associate the set
E` `q(O, t) = { elliptic curves E/Fq |EndFq (E) ∼= O and trpiq = t }/ ∼=Fq .
If this set is non-empty, then the ideal-class group cl(O) acts freely on E` `q(O, t):
for any ideal a ⊂ EndFq (E) of norm coprime with p (every ideal class contains
such ideals), we set E[a] = ∩α∈a kerα and define
[a] ? E = E/E[a].
In other words, we let [a]?E be the (unique) codomain of a separable Fq-rational
isogeny ϕ with domain E and kernel E[a].
The action is usually transitive but exceptionally there may be two orbits;
this happens if and only if the discriminant∆O is a quadratic non-residue modulo
p (which is a very rare event, and not possible in the case of ordinary elliptic
curves because t2 − 4q = c2∆O for some c). For a proof of the above claims,
see [34] and the erratum pointed out in [28, Thm. 4.5].
Remark 3. The set E` `q(t) is not the same as E` `q(O, t). One should think of the
sets E` `q(O, t) for the various orders O as horizontal slices of E` `q(t). Indeed, in
Theorem 1, we saw that the curves on the same level of an m-volcano have the
same endomorphism ring O.
When # cl(O) is large, the set E` `q(O, t) is conjectured to be a hard homo-
geneous space in the sense of Couveignes [10], who was the first to propose its
use for Diffie–Hellman style key exchange; we refer to [15, 8] for recent advances
in making this construction efficient. Couveignes’ proposal was rediscovered by
Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [27], and elaborated in greater detail in Stolbunov’s
PhD thesis, which contains the first appearance of the decisional Diffie–Hellman
problem for group actions [30, Prob. 2.2].
Definition 4 (DDH-CGA). Let Fq, t,O be as above and let E ∈ E` `q(O, t).
The decisional Diffie–Hellman problem is to distinguish with non-negligible ad-
vantage between the distributions ([a]?E, [b]?E, [ab]?E) and ([a]?E, [b]?E, [c]?E)
where [a], [b], [c] are chosen at random from cl(O).
Stolbunov writes: “As far as we are concerned, the most efficient approach is
to solve the corresponding CL group action inverse problem (CL-GAIP).” In our
terminology, this reads that in order to break DDH-CGA, one needs to obtain
[a] from [a] ? E. This paper clearly disproves this statement.
2.4 Genus theory
Genus theory studies which natural numbers arise as norms of ideals in a given
ideal class of an imaginary quadratic order O. It shows that this question is
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governed by the coset of cl(O)2, the subgroup of squares inside cl(O), to which
the ideal class belongs. The details are as follows; this section summarizes parts
of [11, I.§3 & II.§7].
Let ∆O ≡ 0, 1 mod 4 be the discriminant of O, say with distinct odd prime
factors m1 < m2 < . . . < mr. If ∆O ≡ 1 mod 4 then we call
χi : (Z/∆O)∗ → {±1} : a 7→
(
a
mi
)
(for i = 1, . . . , r)
the assigned characters of O. If ∆O = −4n ≡ 0 mod 4, then we extend this list
with δ if n ≡ 1, 4, 5 mod 8, with  if n ≡ 6 mod 8, with δ if n ≡ 2 mod 8, and
with both δ and  if n ≡ 0 mod 8. Here
δ : a 7→ (−1)(a−1)/2 and  : a 7→ (−1)(a2−1)/8.
If n ≡ 3, 7 mod 8 then the list is not extended.
Let µ ∈ {r, r + 1, r + 2} denote the total number of assigned characters and
consider the map Ψ : (Z/∆O)∗ → {±1}µ having these assigned characters as its
components. Then Ψ is surjective and its kernel H consists precisely of those
integers that are coprime with (and that are considered modulo) ∆O and arise
as norms of non-zero principal ideals of O. This leads to a chain of maps
Φ : cl(O) −→ (Z/∆O)
∗
H
∼=−→ {±1}µ,
where the first map sends an ideal class [a] to the norm of a (it is always possible
to choose a representant of norm coprime with ∆O) and the second map is
induced by Ψ . Basically, genus theory tells us that kerΦ = cl(O)2, the subgroup
of squares in cl(O); the cosets of cl(O)2 inside cl(O) are called genera, with
cl(O)2 itself being referred to as the principal genus.
Remark 5. By abuse of notation, we can and will also view χ1, χ2, . . . , χr, δ, 
as morphisms cl(O) → {±1}, obtained by composing Φ with projection on the
corresponding coordinate.
It can be shown that the image of Φ is a subgroup of {±1}µ having index 2,
so that the cardinality of cl(O)/ cl(O)2 ∼= cl(O)[2] equals 2µ−1. More precisely,
if we write ∆O = −2ab with b = me11 me22 · · ·merr , then this is accounted for by
the character
χe11 · χe22 · · ·χerr · δ
b+1
2 mod 2 · a mod 2, (1)
which is non-trivial when viewed on (Z/∆O)∗, but becomes trivial when viewed
on cl(O). For example, if ∆O is squarefree and congruent to 1 mod 4, then the
image of Φ consists of those tuples in {±1}r whose coordinates multiply to 1.
Our main goal is to break DDH in E` `q(O, t). To do this, we will compute
the coordinate components of the map Φ, i.e. upon input of two elliptic curves
E,E′ ∈ E` `q(O, t) that are connected by a secret ideal class [a] ∈ cl(O), for each
assigned character χ we will describe how to compute χ(E,E′) := χ([a]). This
is done in the next sections.
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Example 6. In Section 4, we will study supersingular elliptic curves defined
over Fp with p ≡ 1 mod 4. Here O = Z[√−p] has discriminant −4p, thus there
are two assigned characters: δ and the Legendre character χp associated with
p. But (1) tells us that χp([a]) = δ([a]) and also that χp and δ are necessarily
non-trivial characters of cl(O). So it suffices to compute δ([a]), which as we will
see can be done very efficiently.
2.5 The Tate pairing
We briefly recall the main properties of the (reduced) Tate pairing Tm, which is
defined as
Tm : E(Fqk)[m]× E(Fqk)/mE(Fqk)→ µm : (P,Q) 7→ fm,P (D)(q
k−1)/m .
Here k is the embedding degree, i.e. the smallest extension degree k such that
µm ⊂ F∗qk ; the function fm,P a so-called Miller function, i.e. a function with
divisor (fm,P ) = m(P ) −m(0); D a divisor equivalent to (Q) − (0) coprime to
the support of (fm,P ). If the Miller function fm,P is normalized, and Q 6= P ,
then the pairing can be simply computed as Tm(P,Q) = fm,P (Q)
(qk−1)/m.
The reduced Tate pairing Tm has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: Tm(P,Q1 + Q2) = Tm(P,Q1)Tm(P,Q2) and Tm(P1 + P2, Q) =
Tm(P1, Q)Tm(P2, Q).
2. Non-degeneracy: for all P ∈ E(Fqk)[m] with P 6= 0, there exists a point
Q ∈ E(Fqk)/mE(Fqk) such that Tm(P,Q) 6= 1. Similarly, for all Q ∈ E(Fqk)
with Q 6∈ mE(Fqk), there exists a P ∈ E(Fqk)[m] with Tm(P,Q) 6= 1.
3. Compatibility: let ϕ be an Fq-rational isogeny, then
Tm(ϕ(P ), ϕ(Q)) = Tm(P,Q)
deg(ϕ).
4. Galois invariance: let σ ∈ Gal(Fq/Fq) then Tm(σ(P ), σ(Q)) = σ(Tm(P,Q)).
3 Computing the characters for ordinary curves
Let E/Fq be an ordinary elliptic curve with endomorphism ring O and let m be
a prime divisor of ∆O. Note that m - q, since otherwise m | ∆O | t2 − 4q would
imply that gcd(t, q) 6= 1, contradicting that E is ordinary. By extending the base
field if needed, we can assume without loss of generality that valm(#E(Fq)) ≥ 1.
The approach described in the introduction corresponds to valm(#E(Fq)) = 1,
which implies that E(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z/(m). The idea was to recover the character
from the self-pairings Tm(P, P ) and Tm(P
′, P ′), with P (resp. P ′) any non-zero
Fq-rational m-torsion point on E (resp. E′).
In general we have E(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z/(mr)×Z/(ms) for integers 1 ≤ r ≥ s ≥ 0.
The next theorem shows that by walking all the way down to the floor of the m-
isogeny volcano, we always end up on a curve E0/Fq with E0(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z/(mv),
where v = valm(#E(Fq)).
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Theorem 7. Consider an m-isogeny volcano of ordinary elliptic curves over
a finite field Fq, and let N be their (common) number of Fq-rational points.
Assume v = valm(N) ≥ 1 and let h denote the height of the volcano.
– If v is odd and E is a curve on level 0 ≤ i ≤ h, or if v is even and E is a
curve on level 0 ≤ i ≤ v/2, then
E(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z
(mv−i)
× Z
(mi)
.
– If v is even and E is a curve on level v/2 ≤ i ≤ h, then
E(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z
(mv/2)
× Z
(mv/2)
.
(Note that the latter range may be empty, i.e. one may have h < v/2.)
Proof. See [23, Cor. 1] for m = 2 and [24, Thm. 3] for m odd.
Note that it is easy to verify whether a given curve E/Fq is located on the
floor of its volcano. Indeed, for λ random points P ∈ E(Fq) one simply tests
whether (N/m)P = 0. As soon as one point fails the test, we know that E is on
the floor. If all points pass the test, we are on the floor with probability 1/mλ.
Given such a verification method, a few random walks allow one to find a shortest
path down to the floor, see e.g. the algorithm FindShortestPathToFloor
in [31]. Note that this is considerably easier than navigating the volcano in a
fully controlled way, see again [31] and the references therein.3
Once we are on E0, the natural generalization of the case v = 1 is to compute
the m-Tate pairing Tm(P,Q) with ord(P ) = m and ord(Q) = m
v satisfying
mv−1Q = P . The following theorem shows that the m-Tate pairing is non-trivial
and, for a fixed P , independent of the choice of Q.
Theorem 8. Let E0/Fq be an ordinary elliptic curve with endomorphism ring
O and let m be a prime divisor of ∆O. Assume that
E0(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z
(mv)
for some v ≥ 1. Then for any P,Q with ord(P ) = m and ord(Q) = mv, the
reduced Tate pairing Tm(P,Q) is a primitive m-th root of unity. Furthermore,
for a fixed P , the pairing Tm(P, ·) is constant for all Q with ord(Q) = mv and
mv−1Q = P .
Proof. Set N = #E0(Fq). Since
m | ∆O | t2 − 4q = (q − 1)2 − 2(q + 1)N +N2,
3 In the context of this paper, it is worth highlighting the work of Ionica and Joux [21]
on this topic, who use the Tate pairing as an auxiliary tool for travelling through
the volcano.
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we see that q ≡ 1 mod m, hence µm ⊂ Fq, so the embedding degree of the
Tate pairing is 1. By assumption, Q is a generator of E0(Fq)[m∞] = E0(Fq)[mv]
and thus clearly not in mE0(Fq) since ord(Q) = mv. Since m is prime, the
non-degeneracy of the Tate pairing implies that Tm(P,Q) is a primitive m-th
of unity. Indeed, assume that Tm(P,Q) = 1, then Tm(P, ·) = 1 on the whole of
E0(Fq)/mE0(Fq), since the cosets can be represented by iQ for i = 0, . . . ,m−1,
contradicting non-degeneracy.
Using again E0(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z/(mv), it is easy to see that all points of order
exactly mv with mv−1Q = P are of the form Q + R for ord(R)|mv−1. But
any such R ∈ mE0(Fq), which shows that Tm(P,R) = 1, and so Tm(P,Q) is
independent of the choice in Q. uunionsq
3.1 Computing the characters χi
Let χ be one of the characters χi associated with an odd prime divisor m = mi
of ∆O. As before, we let ϕ : E → E′ denote the isogeny corresponding to a of
degree deg(φ) = N(a). Recall that the goal is to compute χ([a]) =
(
N(a)
m
)
.
Since End(E) = End(E′), by Theorem 1, the curves E and E′ are on the
same level of their respective volcanoes. By taking the same number of steps
down from E and E′ to the floor on their respective isogeny volcanoes, we end
up with two respective elliptic curves E0, E
′
0 in E` `q(O0, t), where O0 ⊂ O is a
suborder having discriminant ∆O0 = m
2s∆O, with s the number of steps taken
to reach the floor.
Since both curves E0 and E
′
0 are now on the floor, we can choose non-trivial
points P ∈ E0[m](Fq) and P ′ ∈ E′0[m](Fq), and corresponding points Q,Q′ of
order exactly mv satisfying mv−1Q = P and mv−1Q′ = P ′. We know that the
class group cl(O0) acts transitively on E` `q(O0, t), see Section 2.3, so there exists
an invertible ideal b ⊂ O0 such that
E′0 = [b] ? E0,
where by [11, Cor. 7.17] it can be assumed that N(b) is coprime with ∆O0 , hence
coprime withm. Let ϕ0 : E0 → E′0 denote the corresponding degree N(b) isogeny.
Then there exists a k ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1} with kϕ0(P ) = P ′. Clearly, the point
kϕ0(Q) also has order m
v and satisfies mv−1X = P ′. From Theorem 8 and the
compatibility of the Tate pairing, it then follows:
Tm(P
′, Q′) = Tm(kϕ0(P ), kϕ0(Q)) = Tm(P,Q)k
2 deg(ϕ0),
and thus (
N(b)
m
)
=
(
deg(ϕ0)
m
)
=
(
logTm(P,Q) Tm(P
′, Q′)
m
)
.
We now show that this in fact equals χ([a]). Indeed, since N(b) is coprime
with ∆O0 , from [11, Prop. 7.20] we see that the ideal bO ⊂ O is invertible and
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again has norm N(b). From the second paragraph of the proof of [31, Lem. 6] we
see that E′ = [bO] ? E, and because the action of cl(O) on E` `q(O, t) is free we
conclude that [bO] = [a]. Summing up, we can compute
χ([a]) = χ([bO]) =
(
N(bO)
m
)
=
(
N(b)
m
)
=
(
logTm(P,Q) Tm(P
′, Q′)
m
)
.
Note that, in particular, this outcome is independent of the choice of the walks
to the floor of the isogeny volcano.
Remark 9. In the appendix we provide an alternative (but more complex) proof
that shows it is not needed to walk all the way down to the floor. However, since
the height of the volcano is about 12 valm(t
2−4q) (see Theorem 1), the volcanoes
cannot be very high (in the worst case a logarithmic number of steps), so walking
to the floor of the volcano is efficient. Furthemore, for odd m, the probability of
the volcano being height zero is roughly 1− 1/m.
3.2 Computing the characters δ, δ and 
For ∆O = −4n, genus theory (Section 2.4) may give extra characters δ,  or δ
depending on n mod 8. Recall that these characters are defined as
δ : [a] 7→ (−1)(N(a)−1)/2 and  : [a] 7→ (−1)(N(a)2−1)/8 ,
where the ideal a is chosen to have odd norm. Determining δ is easily seen to
be equivalent to computing N(a) mod 4. In case both δ and  exist (i.e. when
n ≡ 0 mod 8), it is equivalent to computing N(a) mod 8.
Note that the general approach using Theorem 8 remains valid, but does
not result in sufficient information since it only determines N(a) mod 2, which
is known beforehand since the norm is odd. The solution is to use a 4-pairing to
derive δ and an 8-pairing in the case both δ and  exist. The following theorem is
a generalization of Theorem 8; the main difference is that some care is required
to prove that the values Tm(P,Q) are primitive roots of unity (and not just
different from 1 which follows from the non-degeneracy of the Tate pairing).
Theorem 10. Let E0/Fq be an ordinary elliptic curve with endomorphism ring
O and let m be a prime divisor of ∆O. Furthermore, assume that mn|(q− 1) for
n > 1 and that
E0(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z
(mv)
for some v ≥ n. Then for any P,Q with ord(P ) = mn and ord(Q) = mv, the
reduced Tate pairing Tmn(P,Q) is a primitive m
n-th root of unity. Furthermore,
for a fixed P , the pairing Tmn(P, ·) is constant for all Q with ord(Q) = mv and
mv−nQ = P .
Proof. Assume that Tmn(P,Q) is not a primitive m
n-th root of unity, then
Tmn(P,Q) ∈ µmn−1 , and in particular
1 = Tmn(P,Q)
mn−1 = Tmn(m
n−1P,Q) .
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Since P has order mn, the point mn−1P is not the identity element 0. Further,
since Q generates E0(Fq)[m∞], we conclude that Tmn(mn−1P, ·) is degenerate
on the whole of E0(Fq)/mnE0(Fq), which contradicts the non-degeneracy of the
Tate pairing. Thus we conclude that Tmn(P,Q) is a primitive m
n-th root of
unity. The solutions to mv−nX = P are given by Q + R with ord(R)|mv−n.
But then R ∈ mnE0(Fq) and so Tm(P,R) = 1, which shows that Tmn(P,Q) is
independent of the choice of Q.
Character δ Recall that the character δ exists when n ≡ 0, 1, 4, 5 mod 8.
By taking a field extension if needed, we can assume without loss of general-
ity that v = val2(#E(Fq)) ≥ 2 and that 4 | (q − 1). As before, by walking
down the volcano we reach a curve E0 on the floor (and similarly E
′
0) satisfying
E0(Fq)[2∞] = Z/(2v). We can now apply Theorem 10 for m = 2 and n = 2, and
if b is an ideal connecting E0 and E
′
0, we can compute the exact value
N(b) mod 4 = logT4(P,Q) T4(P
′, Q′) (2)
for appropriately chosen points P,Q ∈ E0(Fq)[2∞] and P ′, Q′ ∈ E′0(Fq)[2∞].
Indeed, recall that the points P ′ and Q′ are only determined by P and Q up to
a scalar k ∈ (Z/(4))∗, i.e. k ≡ 1, 3 mod 4, and so k2 ≡ 1 mod 4.
A similar reasoning as before then shows that [bO] = [a], where we can
assume N(bO) = N(b), so we find that
δ([a]) = δ([bO]) = (−1)(N(bO)−1)/2 = (−1)(logT4(P,Q) T4(P ′,Q′)−1)/2 ,
or, equivalently, we recover N(a) mod 4 by the same formula as in (2).
Characters δ and  Recall that the character δ exists when n ≡ 0, 2 mod 8
and the character  exists when n ≡ 0, 6 mod 8. Again, by taking a field extension
if needed, we can assume without loss of generality that v = val2(#E(Fq)) ≥ 3
and that 8 | (q − 1). Notice that, if δ and  do not exist simultaneously, then
we are necessarily on the surface of the 2-volcano, hence it takes at least one
step to go to curves E0 and E
′
0 on the floor. During this step the discriminant
becomes multiplied by a factor of 4. Hence, on the floor, we are certain that both
characters exist.
Now applying Theorem 10 for m = 2 and n = 3, and using the fact that for
k ≡ 1, 3, 5, 7 mod 8 we have k2 ≡ 1 mod 8, we know that the norm of an ideal b
connecting E0 and E
′
0 satisfies
N(b) mod 8 = logT8(P,Q) T8(P
′, Q′) , (3)
for appropriately chosen points P,Q ∈ E0(Fq)[2∞] and P ′, Q′ ∈ E′0(Fq)[2∞].
The same reasoning as before then shows that [bO] = [a], where we can assume
N(bO) = N(b), hence we find
([a]) = ([bO]) = (−1)(N(bO)2−1)/8 = (−1)((logT8(P,Q) T8(P ′,Q′))2−1)/8 ,
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and similarly for δ. However, in general, we cannot conclude that N(a) mod 8
can be recovered by the same formula as in (3). E.g., if n ≡ 6 mod 8, in the
presence of  but in the absence of δ, an ideal class containing ideals having
norm 1 mod 8 will also contain ideals having norm 7 mod 8. It is during the first
step down the volcano that both congruence classes become separated.
4 Computing the characters for supersingular curves
We now turn our attention to supersingular elliptic curves over prime fields Fp
with p > 3. Recall that any such curve E/Fp has exactly p + 1 rational points
and its Frobenius satisfies pi2 + p = 0, therefore O = Endp(E) has discriminant
∆O =
{−4p if p ≡ 1 mod 4,
−p or − 4p if p ≡ 3 mod 4.
From genus theory, we see that cl(O) has non-trivial 2-torsion only in the former
case. So we will restrict our attention to p ≡ 1 mod 4, in which case O = Z[√−p].
There are two assigned characters: the Legendre character associated with p,
and δ. From the character relation (1) (see also Example 6), we see that these
coincide on cl(O), therefore it suffices to compute δ. Unfortunately, due to the
peculiar behaviour of supersingular elliptic curves over Fp2 , we cannot apply our
strategy of “extending the base field and going down the volcano”.
Instead, we can compute δ directly on the input curves, i.e. not involving
vertical isogenies. This is handled by the following theorem, which can be used
to compute δ in many ordinary cases, too. The proof is entirely self-contained,
although its flavour is similar to that of Section 3.
Theorem 11. Let q ≡ 1 mod 4 be a prime power and let E,E′/Fq be elliptic
curves with endomorphism ring O and trace of Frobenius t ≡ 0 mod 4, connected
by an ideal class [a] ∈ cl(O). Then δ is an assigned character of O, and if we
write
E : y2 = x3 + ax2 + bx resp. E′ : y2 = x3 + a′x2 + b′x (4)
then δ([a]) = (b′/b)(q−1)/4.
Proof. As t ≡ 0 mod 4, we have #E(Fq) = #E′(Fq) = q + 1− t ≡ 2 mod 4, and
therefore both curves contain a unique rational point of order 2. When positioned
at (0, 0), we indeed obtain models of the form (4). We point out that b(q−1)/4
does not depend on the specific choice of such a model: it is easy to check that
the only freedom left is scaling a by u2 and b by u4 for some u ∈ F∗q . Then, of
course, the same remark applies to b′(q−1)/4.
On E, the points (x0, y0) doubling to P = (0, 0) satisfy the condition
3x20 + 2ax0 + b
2y0
=
y0
x0
,
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which can be rewritten as x0(x
2
0 − b) = 0. Therefore these points are(√
b,±
√
b(a+ 2
√
b)
)
and
(
−
√
b,±
√
b(a− 2
√
b)
)
,
from which we see that b is a non-square. Indeed, if we would have
√
b ∈ Fq,
then one of a ± 2√b would be a square in Fq because their product a2 − 4b is
not (since there is only one Fq-rational point of order 2). This would imply the
existence of an Fq-rational point of order 4, contradicting #E(Fq) ≡ 2 mod 4.
As a consequence, we can characterize b as −x(Q) · x(piq(Q)), where Q denotes
any of the four halves of P . The same reasoning shows that b′ is a non-square,
and that it can be rewritten as −x(Q′) ·x(piq(Q′)) with Q′ any of the four halves
of P ′ = (0, 0) ∈ E′.
Now let ϕ : E → E′ be the isogeny corresponding to a representative a of [a]
having odd norm (coprime to q). Denote by ±K1,±K2, . . . ,±K(N(a)−1)/2 the
non-trivial points in kerϕ, say with x-coordinates x1, x2, . . . , x(N(a)−1)/2 ∈ Fq.
Since ϕ is defined over Fq, we see that ϕ(P ) = P ′. The other points mapping to
P ′ are P ±K1, P ±K2, . . . , P ±K(N(a)−1)/2, and an easy calculation shows that
the x-coordinates of these points are b/x1, b/x2, . . . , b/x(N(a)−1)/2. This implies
that the function
x
(N(a)−1)/2∏
i=1
x− bxi
x− xi
2
viewed on E has the same divisor as x ◦ ϕ, therefore both functions are propor-
tional. To determine the constant involved, we can assume that our curve E′
is obtained through an application of Ve´lu’s formulae [14, Prop. 38], composed
with a translation along the x-axis that positions P ′ at (0, 0). From [14, Cor. 39]
we then see that the leading coefficient of the numerator of x ◦ ϕ equals N(a)−
3(N(a) − 1) + 2(N(a) − 1) = 1. So the involved constant is just 1, i.e. equality
holds.
Let Q ∈ E be one of the halves of P , then ϕ(Q) is a half of ϕ(P ) = P ′, so
we can write
b′ = −x(ϕ(Q)) · x(piq(ϕ(Q)))
= −(x ◦ ϕ)(Q) · (x ◦ ϕ)(piq(Q))
= b
(N(a)−1)/2∏
i=1
(
√
b− bxi )(−
√
b− bxi )
(
√
b− xi)(−
√
b− xi)
2
=
bN(a)(∏(N(a)−1)/2
i=1 xi
)4 .
The theorem then follows by raising both sides to the power (q− 1)/4 and using
that we end up with primitive fourth roots of unity (indeed, recall that b and b′
are non-square), whose ratio is either 1 or −1. uunionsq
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Note that we can rewrite
b
q−1
4 = (−x(Q) · x(piq(Q)))
q−1
4 =
(−f2,P (Q)1+q) q−14 = (−1) q−14 f2,P (Q) q2−14 ,
so the above proof can be seen to rely on a disguised, non-fully reduced 2-Tate
pairing.
5 Impact on DDH and countermeasures
5.1 Impact on decisional Diffie–Hellman for class group actions
It is clear that any non-trivial character χ (or δ, , δ) can be used to determine
whether a sample (E′ = [a]?E,E′′ = [b]?E,E′′′) is a true Diffie-Hellman sample,
i.e. whether E′′′ = [a ·b]?E or not. For instance, one could compute χ([a]) in two
different ways, e.g. namely as χ(E,E′) and compare with χ(E′′, E′′′). Similarly,
one could compute χ([b]) as χ(E,E′′) as well as χ(E′, E′′′). If the sample is not
a true Diffie-Hellman sample this will be detected with probability 1/2. In many
cases we have more than one character available, so if we assume that s < µ
linearly independent characters are computable (see below for the complexity of
a single character), this probability increases to 1− 1/2s.
Supersingular curves For supersingular curves over Fp with p ≡ 1 mod 4,
the character δ exists and is always non-trivial (see Example 6). As shown in
Section 4, computing this character requires computing a 2-torsion point, one
inversion and one exponentiation in Fp, so in this case, DDH can be broken in
time O(log p ·Mp) with Mp the cost of a multiplication in Fp.
Ordinary curves For ordinary curves, we will order the characters (if they ex-
ist) according to their complexity: δ, , δ, χmi for i = 1, . . . , r. From genus the-
ory, it follows that at most one of the µ characters is trivial (since # cl(O)[2] =
2µ−1), so if the easiest to compute character is trivial, we immediately con-
clude that the second easiest to compute character is non-trivial. To determine
the complexity, assume that m is an odd prime divisor of ∆O. To be able to
apply our attack, we first need to find the smallest extension Fqk such that
valm(#E(Fqk)) > 0. Since m | ∆O | t2 − 4q, we conclude that the matrix of
Frobenius on E[m] is of the form(
λ 1
0 λ
)
or
(
λ 0
0 λ
)
,
with λ2 ≡ q mod m. In both cases, for k = ord(λ) ∈ Z/(m)∗, we conclude that
valm(#E(Fqk)) > 0. Furthermore, since the determinant of the k-th power equals
qk ≡ λ2k ≡ 1 mod m, we conclude that µm ⊂ Fqk and thus the m-Tate pairing is
defined over Fqk . We see that in the worst case, we have k = m− 1. Computing
the m-Tate pairing requires O(logm · Mqk) which is O(m1+ε · Mq) assuming
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fast polynomial arithmetic and using k < m. The cost of walking down the
volcano [31] over Fqk in the worst case is given byO(h·(m3+ε·log q)·Mq) assuming
fast polynomial arithmetic (and k < m−1), with h a bound on the height of the
volcano. Once we reached the floor of the volcano, we need to solve the equation
mv−1Q = P , with P an m-torsion point, and v = valm(#E(Fqk)). This can
be computed deterministically using division polynomials, or probabilistically as
follows: first generate a point Q1 of order m
v, and compute P1 = m
v−1Q1. Since
we are on the floor, E(Fq)[m] is cyclic, so there exists a k with P = kP1. Then
Q = kQ1 is a solution. This randomized approach can be done in expected time
O(m3+ε · log q ·Mq).
As remarked before, we note that in the majority of cases (probability roughly
1− 1/m), the height of the m-volcano is zero and the complexity of the attack
is solely determined by the computation of the Tate pairing.
Computing the exact coset modulo cl(O)2 Genus theory shows that cl(O)2
equals the intersection of the kernels of the assigned characters. Thanks to the
class group relation (1), we are allowed to omit one character. If all remaining
characters have a manageable complexity, this allows to determine completely
the coset of cl(O)2 inside cl(O) to which our secret ideal class [a] belongs.
5.2 Implementation results
We implemented our attack in the Magma computer algebra system [5] and the
code is given in Appendix B. The main functions are ComputeEvenCharacters,
ComputeOddCharacter and ComputeSupersingularDelta. We also use a very
simple randomized method to walk to the floor of the volacano in function
ToFloor. A more efficient approach can be found in [31].
To illustrate the code, we apply it to an example found in [15, Section 4]. In
particular, let
p = 7
 ∏
2≤`≤380,`prime
`
− 1
and consider the elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 +Ax2 + x with
A =108613385046492803838599501407729470077036464083728
319343246605668887327977789321424882535651456036725
91944602210571423767689240032829444439469242521864171
,
then End(E) is the maximal order and E lies on the surface of a volcano of
height 2. By construction, the curve has Fp-rational subgroups of order ` with
` ∈ [3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 103, 523, 821, 947, 1723]. The discriminant is of the form
−4n with n ≡ 2 mod 8, so we will be able to compute the character δ.
The code first computes a random isogeny of degree 523 (easy to compute
since it is rational), to obtain the “challenge” E′ = [a] ? E. After going to a
degree 2 extension, it then descends the volcano to the floor, and on the floor,
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it computes both δ as well as , from which it derives that δ(E,E′) = 1, which
is consistent with the fact that δ([a]) = δ(523) = 1.
5.3 Countermeasures
Since the attack crucially relies on the existence of 2-torsion in cl(O), the simplest
countermeasure is to restrict to a setting where cl(O)[2] is trivial, e.g. supersin-
gular elliptic curves over Fp with p ≡ 3 mod 4. This corresponds precisely to the
CSIDH setting [8], so our attack does not impact CSIDH.
Another standard approach is to work with co-factors: since all characters
become trivial on cl(O)2 we can simply restrict to elements which are squares,
i.e. in the Diffie-Hellman protocol one would sample [a]2 and [b]2.
Warning We advise to be much more cautious than simply squaring. Genus
theory gives the structure of cl(O)[2], but one can also derive the structure
of the 2-Sylow subgroup cl(O)[2∞] using an algorithm going back to Gauss
and analyzed in detail by Bosma and Stevenhagen [6]. Although our attack is
currently not refined enough to also exploit this extra information, we expect
that a generalization of our attack will be able to do so. As such, instead of
simply squaring, we advise to use as cofactor an upper bound on the exponent
of the 2-Sylow subgroup.
6 Conclusion
We showed how the characters defined by genus theory for the class group cl(O)
can be computed from the group action of cl(O) on E` `q(O, t), knowing only the
equations of two elliptic curves E and E′ = [a] ? E, for an unknown ideal class
[a]. For a character χ associated to the prime divisor m | ∆O, the complexity
is exponential in the size of m, and it is thus efficiently computable only for
smallish m. However, since only one such character is required to break DDH
for class group actions, we conclude that for a subset of density 1 of ordinary
curves, and for all supersingular curves over Fp with p ≡ 1 mod 4, DDH (without
appropriate countermeasures) is broken. Note that CSIDH [8] is not affected,
since it relies on supersingular elliptic curves over Fp with p ≡ 3 mod 4.
The main, quite surprising, insight of this paper is that the structure of the
class group cl(O) does actually matter, and cannot be assumed to be fully hidden
when represented as E` `q(O, t) under the class group action ?. Philosophically,
one might argue that this is inherently caused by the fact that the structure of
cl(O)[2] is easily computable. As such, it is imperative to analyze the following
two cases which also give partial information about the class group cl(O):
– As already mentioned in Section 5.3, the algorithm described by Bosma and
Stevenhagen [6] determines the structure of the 2-Sylow group cl(O)[2∞].
Can our attack be extended to take this extra information into account?
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– The class number formula expressing the class number of a suborder O in
terms of the class number of the maximal order OK and the conductor c
h(O) = h(OK)c
[O∗K : O∗]
∏
p|c
(
1−
(
∆OK
p
)
1
p
)
,
can be used to derive certain prime factors of h(O) without knowing h(OK).
For instance, in the case of CSIDH with p ≡ 3 mod 8 where O = Z[√−p], the
above formula implies that h(O) is divisible by 3. Can an attack be devised
where such factors are exploited?
Finally, we note that in most settings the exact structure of cl(O) is unknown,
so the usual approach of restricting to a large prime order subgroup does not
apply. As a precaution, we therefore advise to work with supersingular curves
E/Fp with p ≡ 3 mod 4, such that End(E) = OK , i.e. restrict to curves on the
surface as was done in the recent CSURF construction [7].
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A Not walking to the floor
As explained in Section 3, our approach to computing χ(E,E′) is to take an
arbitrary walk to the floor of the respective m-isogeny volcanoes of E and E′.
The following modification of Theorem 8 shows that, in fact, it suffices to stop
walking down as soon as one reaches a level where the m∞-torsion is sufficiently
unbalanced. In some cases, this leads to a slight speed-up.
Theorem 12. Let E/Fq be an ordinary elliptic curve with endomorphism ring
O, let m be a prime divisor of ∆O, and assume that E is not located on the
crater of its m-volcano. Assume that
E(Fq)[m∞] ∼= Z
(mr)
× Z
(ms)
for some r > s + 1. Let P ∈ E(Fq)[m] \ {∞} be such that there exists a point
Q ∈ E(Fq) for which mr−1Q = P . Then the reduced Tate pairing
Tm(P, ·) : E(Fq)/mE(Fq)→ µm : X 7→ Tm(P,X) (5)
is trivial if and only if X belongs to E[ms] mod mE(Fq). In particular, Tm(P,Q)
is a primitive m-th root of unity which, for a fixed P , does not depend on the
choice of Q.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 8, we see that µm ⊆ Fq. As explained in [2,
IX.7.1], the kernel of Tm(P, ·) is a codimension 1 subspace of E(Fq)/mE(Fq),
when viewed as a vector space over Fm. Therefore it suffices to prove that
Tm(P, ·) is trivial on E[ms] mod mE(Fq), because the latter space indeed has
codimension 1. More precisely, it has dimension 0 if s = 0 and dimension 1 if
s ≥ 1.
Now, since we are not on the crater, we know that there exists an elliptic curve
E′/Fq along with an Fq-rational m-isogeny ϕ : E′ → E such that E′(Fq)[m∞] ∼=
Z/(mr−1)× Z/(ms+1). We note:
– E[ms] ⊆ ϕ(E′[ms+1]) ⊆ ϕ(E′(Fq)), hence each X ∈ E[ms] can be written
as ϕ(X ′) for some X ′ ∈ E′(Fq).
– The kernel of the dual isogeny ϕˆ : E → E′ equals 〈P 〉, otherwise E′
would admit Fq-rational mr-torsion, therefore P is the image of a point
P ′ ∈ E′[m] ⊆ E′(Fq).
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We conclude that
Tm(P,X) = Tm(ϕ(P
′), ϕ(X ′)) = Tm(P ′, X ′)deg(ϕ) = Tm(P ′, X ′)m = 1,
as wanted. uunionsq
Along the same lines of thought, one can give a similar modification of
Theorem 10. We actually believe that the assumptions in Theorem 12 can be
weakened to include the cases where r = s+ 1 and/or where E is located on the
crater; a proof of this generalization is in progress.
B Magma code
1 // Returns factors with multiplicity up to bound B
2
3 function SimpleTrialDivision(a, B)
4 facs := TrialDivision(a, B);
5 if (#facs gt 0 and facs[#facs ][1] gt B) then
6 // removing last factor if too large
7 Remove (~facs , #facs);
8 end if;
9 return facs;
10 end function;
11
12 // The next four functions allow us to walk to the floor
13 // They also return the distance to the floor
14
15 function OnFloor(E, m, numpts)
16 v := Valuation(numpts , m);
17 onfloor := false;
18 for i in [1..80] do
19 if m^(v-1)*( numpts div m^v)*Random(E) ne E ! 0 then
20 onfloor := true;
21 break i;
22 end if;
23 end for;
24 return onfloor;
25 end function;
26
27 // Random point of order m whose Weil pairing with Q is
28 // non -trivial assumes m-torsion is fully rational
29
30 function FindIndependentOrdermPoint(E, Q, m)
31 Fq := BaseField(E);
32 R<X> := PolynomialRing(Fq);
33 coeffs := Eltseq(E);
34 defpol := X^3 + coeffs [2]*X^2 + coeffs [4]*X + coeffs [5];
35 xcoords := [rt[1] : rt in Roots(DivisionPolynomial(E,m))];
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36 repeat
37 x := Random(xcoords);
38 y := Sqrt(Evaluate(defpol ,x));
39 P := E ! [x,y,1];
40 until WeilPairing(P,Q,m) ne 1;
41 return P;
42 end function;
43
44 // Random point of order m
45
46 function FindOrdermPoint(E, m)
47 Fq := BaseField(E);
48 R<X> := PolynomialRing(Fq);
49 coeffs := Eltseq(E);
50 defpol := X^3 + coeffs [2]*X^2 + coeffs [4]*X + coeffs [5];
51 xcoords := [rt[1] : rt in Roots(DivisionPolynomial(E,m))];
52 x := Random(xcoords);
53 y := Sqrt(Evaluate(defpol ,x));
54 return E ! [x,y,1];
55 end function;
56
57 // Walking to the floor of the volcano
58 // Returns height and distance to the floor
59 // Assumes existence of point of order m
60
61 function ToFloor(E, m, numpts)
62 Fq := BaseField(E);
63 q := #Fq;
64 t := q + 1 - numpts;
65 disc_frob := t^2 - 4*q;
66 h := Floor(Valuation(disc_frob ,m)/2); // height of the
volcano
67 if m eq 2 and (disc_frob div 4^h) mod 4 in {2,3} then
68 h -:= 1;
69 end if;
70 if OnFloor(E, m, numpts) then
71 return E, h, 0;
72 else
73 R<X> := PolynomialRing(Fq);
74 repeat
75 pathtofloor := 0;
76 Efloor := E;
77 Q := FindOrdermPoint(Efloor , m);
78 repeat
79 P := FindIndependentOrdermPoint(Efloor , Q, m);
80 if m eq 2 then
81 Efloor , phi := IsogenyFromKernel(Efloor , X - P[1]);
82 else
83 Efloor , phi := IsogenyFromKernel(Efloor , &*[X - (i*
P)[1] : i in [1..(m-1) div 2]]);
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84 end if;
85 Q := phi(Q);
86 pathtofloor +:= 1;
87 until pathtofloor gt h or OnFloor(Efloor , m, numpts);
88 until pathtofloor le h; // otherwise we passed through
surface
89 return Efloor , h, pathtofloor;
90 end if;
91 end function;
92
93 // Computes minimal extension such that m-torsion is rational
94 // Returns extension degree and number of points over
extension
95
96 function MinimalExtensionmTorsion(m, p, numpts)
97 t := p+1-numpts;
98 Ts := [t, t^2 - 2*p];
99 Ns := [numpts , p^2 + 1 - Ts[2]];
100 for i := 3 to m-1 do
101 Append (~Ts, t*Ts[i-1] - p*Ts[i-2]);
102 end for;
103 for d in Divisors(m-1) do
104 if (Valuation(p^d + 1 - Ts[d], m) ge 1) then
105 return d, p^d + 1 - Ts[d];
106 end if;
107 end for;
108 return 0, 0;
109 end function;
110
111 // Listing available characters smaller than bound B
112 // Odd primes m appearing in t^2 - 4*p to an even power ,
113 // or for which we need to go to a large extension to see
114 // some m-torsion are currently ignored.
115
116 function ListCharacters(E, B, numpts)
117
118 p := #BaseField(E);
119 t := p+1-numpts;
120 disc_frob := t^2 - 4*p;
121
122 factors := SimpleTrialDivision(disc_frob , B);
123
124 even_chars := [];
125 odd_chars := [];
126 for fac in factors do
127 if fac [1] ne 2 then
128 if IsOdd(fac [2]) then // prime definitely divides
Delta_O
129 m := fac [1];
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130 if (MinimalExtensionmTorsion(m, p, numpts) lt 50)
then
131 odd_chars cat:= [m];
132 end if;
133 end if;
134 else
135 ext , numpts_ext := MinimalExtensionmTorsion (2, p,
numpts);
136 q := p^ext;
137 Fq := GF(p, ext);
138 E_ext := BaseChange(E, Fq);
139 _, h, pathtofloor := ToFloor(E_ext , 2, numpts_ext);
140 real_disc := disc_frob div 4^ pathtofloor; // locally
around 2, but enough
141 if IsEven(real_disc) then
142 if (-real_disc div 4) mod 4 le 1 then
143 even_chars := ["delta"];
144 end if;
145 case (-real_disc div 4) mod 8:
146 when 0, 6: Append (~even_chars , "epsilon");
147 when 2: Append (~even_chars , "delta*epsilon");
148 end case;
149 end if;
150 end if;
151 end for;
152
153 return even_chars , odd_chars;
154 end function;
155
156 // This function computes characters associated to odd prime
157
158 function ComputeOddCharacter(m, E, Eisog , numpts)
159
160 print "Computing character associated with odd prime m =",
m;
161
162 p := #BaseField(E);
163 t := p+1-numpts;
164
165 ext , numpts_ext := MinimalExtensionmTorsion(m, p, numpts);
166 v := Valuation(numpts_ext , m);
167 q := p^ext;
168 print " (constructing field Fq of degree", ext ,"over Fp)
";
169 Fq := GF(p, ext);
170
171 Tm := [];
172 if v eq 1 then
173 print " Base case using self -pairing";
174 for ell_curve in [E, Eisog] do
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175 ell_ext := BaseChange(ell_curve , Fq);
176 repeat
177 P := (numpts_ext div m)*Random(ell_ext);
178 until P ne ell_ext ! 0;
179 Tm cat:= [TatePairing(P,P,m)^((q-1) div m)];
180 end for;
181 else
182 for ell_curve in [E, Eisog] do
183 ell_ext := BaseChange(ell_curve , Fq);
184 print " Walking to floor ...";
185 Efloor , h := ToFloor(ell_ext , m, numpts_ext);
186 print " Heigth of volcano is ", h;
187 repeat
188 P := (numpts_ext div m)*Random(Efloor);
189 until P ne Efloor ! 0;
190 repeat
191 Q := (numpts_ext div m^v)*Random(Efloor);
192 until m^(v-1)*Q eq P;
193 Tm cat:= [TatePairing(P,Q,m)^((q - 1) div m)];
194 end for;
195 end if;
196
197 // Computing discrete log naively
198
199 for expo in [1..m-1] do
200 if Tm[2] eq Tm[1]^ expo then
201 return LegendreSymbol(expo , m);
202 end if;
203 end for;
204
205 return 0;
206
207 end function;
208
209 // This procedure computes characters associated to prime 2
210
211 function ComputeEvenCharacters(even_chars , E, Eisog , numpts)
212
213 print "Computing characters associated with m = 2:";
214
215 p := #BaseField(E);
216 t := p+1-numpts;
217 S<X> := PolynomialRing(Integers ());
218
219 ext := 0;
220 repeat
221 ext +:= 1;
222 numpts_ext := Resultant (1 - X^ext , X^2 - t*X + p);
223 v := Valuation(numpts_ext , 2);
224 q := p^ext;
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225 until q mod 8 eq 1 and v ge 3; // v ge 2 would have
sufficed for delta
226 q := p^ext;
227 print " Constructing field Fq of degree", ext ,"over Fp";
228 Fq := GF(p, ext);
229
230 T8 := [];
231
232 for ell_curve in [E, Eisog] do
233 ell_ext := BaseChange(ell_curve , Fq);
234 print " Walking to floor ...";
235 Efloor , h := ToFloor(ell_ext , 2, numpts_ext);
236 print " Heigth of volcano is ", h;
237 repeat
238 P := (numpts_ext div 2^3)*Random(Efloor);
239 until 4*P ne Efloor ! 0;
240 repeat
241 Q := (numpts_ext div 2^v)*Random(Efloor);
242 until 2^(v-3)*Q eq P;
243 T8 cat:= [TatePairing(P,Q,8) ^((q-1) div 8)];
244 end for;
245
246 for e in [1,3,5,7] do
247 if T8[2] eq T8[1]^e then
248 expo := e;
249 end if;
250 end for;
251
252 delta := (-1)^(( expo - 1) div 2);
253 epsilon := (-1)^(( expo^2 - 1) div 8);
254 result := [];
255 for char in even_chars do
256 case char:
257 when "delta": Append (~result , delta);
258 when "epsilon": Append (~result , epsilon);
259 when "delta*epsilon": Append (~result , delta*epsilon);
260 end case;
261 end for;
262
263 return result;
264 end function;
265
266 // Computes character delta for supersingular curve
267 // over F_p with p = 1 mod 4
268
269 function ComputeSuperingularDelta(E, Eisog)
270
271 Fpx <x> := PolynomialRing(BaseField(E));
272 Ew := WeierstrassModel(E);
273 Eisogw := WeierstrassModel(Eisog);
28
274 a := Coefficients(Ew)[4];
275 r := Roots(x^3 + Fpx ! Reverse(Coefficients(Ew)), BaseField
(E))[1][1];
276 aiso := Coefficients(Eisogw)[4];
277 riso := Roots(x^3 + Fpx ! Reverse(Coefficients(Eisogw)),
BaseField(E))[1][1];
278
279 char := ((aiso + 3*riso ^2)/(a + 3*r^2))^((# BaseField(E) -
1) div 4);
280 if (char ne 1) then char := -1; end if;
281
282 return char;
283
284 end function;
285
286 // Computes even character given degree ell
287
288 function ComputeEvenChar(cha , ell)
289 case cha:
290 when "delta": return (-1)^((ell -1) div 2);
291 when "epsilon": return (-1)^(( ell^2-1) div 8);
292 when "delta*epsilon": return (-1)^( ((ell -1) div 2) + ((
ell^2-1) div 8));
293 end case;
294 return 0;
295 end function;
296
297 // Defining Kieffer -de Feo -Smith example
298
299 p := 120373407382088450343833839782228011370920294512701979\
300 23071397735408251586669938291587857560356890516069961904754\
301 171956588530344066457839297755929645858769;
302 A := 1086133850464928038385995014077294700770364640837283193\
303 432466056688873279777893214248825356514560367259194460221057\
304 1423767689240032829444439469242521864171;
305 ell := 523;
306 N := 1203734073820884503438338397822280113709202945127019792\
307 307139773540825158667008548113803008846179093820187417165277\
308 1344144043268298219947026188471598838060;
309 Fp := GF(p);
310 R<x> := PolynomialRing(Fp);
311 E := EllipticCurve ([0, Fp ! A, 0, 1, 0]);
312
313 // constructing isogeneous curve
314
315 repeat
316 P := (N div ell)*Random(E);
317 until (P ne E ! 0);
318 Eisog := IsogenyFromKernel(E, &*[x - (i*P)[1] : i in [1..
Floor(ell/2)]]);
29
319 even_chars , odd_chars := ListCharacters(E, 1000, N); //
bound 1000 on character
320
321 if #even_chars ne 0 then
322 r_even := ComputeEvenCharacters(even_chars , E, Eisog , N);
323 ind := 0;
324 for char in even_chars do
325 ind := ind +1;
326 print "Computed char ", char , " = ", r_even[ind], "vs ",
char , " = ", ComputeEvenChar(char , ell);
327 end for;
328 end if;
329
330 for m in odd_chars do
331 char_m := ComputeOddCharacter(m, E, Eisog , N);
332 print "Computed char = ", char_m , "vs Leg(ell , m) = ",
LegendreSymbol(ell , m);
333 end for;
30
